JOEL P. LIBUIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 154363.  September 13, 2005

Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused Joel, once in possession of the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands to return the said car to the owner, accused refused.

It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for repair at the Paeng Motorworks operated by the Joel.  The car was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who assured the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor shop.

When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out because it also needed repairs.  Joel and Bautista assured him that they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundo’s house after two weeks.  However, Joel failed to deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had sold the car’s differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.

Joel testified on direct examination.  However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.

At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices.  On motion of the prosecution, court issued an order striking from the records Joel's direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court.  CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel of his right to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza.  When said counsel withdrew, the trial court allowed the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. It ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.

Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?

Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment.  No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice.  When the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination.  Indeed, after his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel. 

The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented.  In fact, the repeated failure to appear of Joel's counsel may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself.  We think that such liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petition is denied.

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, Petitioner, vs. CFI OF MANILA, et al., Respondents

G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981

Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena, Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate was affirmed by the CA.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.

Issue: whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.

Held: In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property came.

3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant .

The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are excluded. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such as donacion and succession.

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.

The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.

Problema na naman!

Sinong wala? lahat naman meron nyan, minsan nga araw araw pa. Kanino ka lumalapit pag may problema ka? Dapat, wala kang lapitan, magdasal ka na lang. Problema mo yan, kaw lang ang makakapag-solve nyan.

Nakakatulong ba sila sa pagbibigay ng payo sa'yo? Di ba minsan nga lalo kang naguguluhan, nalilito, at lalo lang lumalaki ang problema? Mabuti ring makinig sa iba, pero bawat desisyon, dapat manggaling ito sayo at sayo lang. May isip ka di ba? dapat gamitin mo. Hindi mo dapat ipaubaya sa iba ang buhay mo. Sayo nakasalalay kung anong mangyayari sa hinaharap sa bawat desisyon na gagawin mo.

"Alam ko kung anong nararamdama mo." Alam nga ba nya o nila? Hindi! Hindi nila alam. Iba iba tayo. Walang pareho sa mundo. Kahit pareho pang issue yan, ang solusyon o desisyon ng isa ay hindi makapagbibigay ng parehong resulta kung sa ibang tao na. 

Sana yun ang naiisip ng iba bago makielam sa problema ng iba. Oo, yung iba, hindi na concern kundi nakikielam o nakikisawsaw na lang. 

the end is near

Hindi ito yung kanta. Nararamdaman ko na, malapit na kong lumisan sa kinauupuan kong ito. Lalo na ngayon na pine PESte ako dito, malapit na ang January, at mahirap na ang mga subjects ko. Sabi ko nga kay Mae, mararamdaman naman kung panahon na. Konti na lang, bibigay na ko. Sayang naeenjoy ko pa naman mga nakakasalamuha ko dito. hay...