JOEL P. LIBUIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 154363.  September 13, 2005

Facts: Joel Libuit was charged with the crime of estafa. Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and brought his car (Chevy 2dr. HT: Plate No. EDD-725) valued at P60,000.00, to the motor shop owned and/or operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair, it was received by Jose Bautista, mechanic, but accused Joel, once in possession of the said car, misappropriated, converted and/or misapplied the said car to his own personal use and benefit and despite repeated demands to return the said car to the owner, accused refused.

It appears from the prosecution evidence that sometime in May 1993, del Mundo, brought his car for repair at the Paeng Motorworks operated by the Joel.  The car was received by Jose Bautista, a mechanic, in the presence of the Joel who assured the del Mundo that it would be safe in his motor shop.

When del Mundo returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he saw his car by the roadside while the engine was inside the shop. Bautista explained that the engine was pulled out because it also needed repairs.  Joel and Bautista assured him that they would finish the repair work and deliver the car to del Mundo’s house after two weeks.  However, Joel failed to deliver the car. Del Mundo gave him another two weeks. Thereafter, del Mundo returned to the motor shop and found that his car was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that Joel had sold the car’s differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found.

Joel testified on direct examination.  However, his defense counsel, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza withdrew from the case after his initial cross-examination. The continuation of his cross-examination was reset to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. Joel eventually secured the services of Atty. Jose Dimayuga.

At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices.  On motion of the prosecution, court issued an order striking from the records Joel's direct testimony and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.

Court found herein petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the decision of trial court.  CA held that the trial court never deprived Joel of his right to counsel as he was represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza.  When said counsel withdrew, the trial court allowed the resetting of Joel's cross-examination to give him time to engage the services of another counsel. It ordered the striking of his testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.

Issue: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel?

Held: Joel contends that the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment.  No such duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own choice.  When the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and Joel appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

Since Joel was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-examination.  Indeed, after his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel. 

The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter render judgment upon the evidence already presented.  In fact, the repeated failure to appear of Joel's counsel may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s proceedings.

The appointment of a counsel de oficio in a situation like the present case would be discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by the petitioner himself.  We think that such liberality removes any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Petition is denied.